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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
David D. Purdum appeals from the judgment of conviction entered upon
his conditional guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance challenging the
denial of his motion to suppress.
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedinqs
On October 8, 2003, the district court filed an order1 in a separate case
placing Purdum on probation for possession of methamphetamine (hereafter
"Probation Order"), which required Purdum to "submit to random blood, breath
and/or urine analysis upon the request of the Court, his probation officer or any
law enforcement official." (R., p.95.) Just prior, on September 26, 2003, Purdum
signed a "Community Corrections Agreement of Supervision" (hereafter
"Community Corrections Agreement", Exhibit d).

In paragraphs 6 and 8

respectively, Purdum agreed to submit to the search of his person and property
and submit to controlled substances tests as requested by his supervising officer
or agent of the Division of Community Corrections Services. (Id.)
Two years later, Officer Reeder, "who knew that [Purdum] was on
probation and who knew the terms of that probation" (R., p.58), saw Purdum and
decided to stop him and request a urinalysis test (R., p.4). Officer Reeder, in his
Purdum moved to augment the record with the district court's order the same
day he filed his opening brief. (Motion to Augment and Statement in Support,
Docket No. 33073, filed June 15, 2007). He later filed a revised motion.
(Revised Motion to Augment and Statement in Support, Docket No.33073, filed
June 19, 2007.) The Idaho Supreme Court granted Purdum's revised motion to
augment by order on June 28, 2007. (Order, Motion to Augment, Docket No.
33073, June 28, 2007.) The pages of the order are numbered consecutively with
the record for the convenience of the court.

patrol vehicle, approached Purdum while Purdum was exiting his parked vehicle
and talking on a cell phone. (Id.) As Officer Reeder approached, and before
Officer Reeder could ask Purdum to stop, Purdum "took approximately ten steps
then bolted." (Id.) Officer Reeder activated his patrol lights and sounded his
horn to "make [Purdum] aware that I wanted to talk to him." (Id.) When Officer
Reeder exited his car and located Purdum hiding under a tarp in a shed, he
ordered Purdum out and asked Purdum why he ran. (Id.)
Purdum continued to talk on the cell phone and Officer Reeder advised
Purdum twice more to stop talking on the phone, but Purdum continued to talk.
(R., p.4.) Officer Reeder then advised Purdum that if he did not stop talking, then
he would arrest Purdum for obstruction. (Id.) Officer Reeder told Purdum that he
was going to pat him down for weapons and Purdum "said he had a knife in his
right pants pocket then reached in his pocket." (Id.) Officer Reeder told Purdum
to keep his hands out of his pockets and place them on the patrol car. (Id.)
However, as Officer Reeder began to perform a search and before any items
were obtained from Purdum's person, Purdum fled for the second time.

(R.,

pp.4-5.)
Officer Reeder pursued Purdum, and after Purdum tripped and fell, Officer
Reeder made contact with Purdum. (R., p.5.) Officer Peterson arrived to assist,
and both the officers took Purdum into custody. (Id.) Officer Reeder advised
Purdum that he was under arrest for obstruction, read Purdum his Miranda rights,
and searched him incident to arrest. (Id.) Officer Reeder discovered multiple
lighters and a butane lighter on Purdum's person, as well as a butane torch, a

propane torch, Visine, and urinary supplement pills in Purdum's vehicle. (Id.)
Relying on his training and experience that these items are associated with meth
use, Officer Reeder opened the motor compartment of Purdum's vehicle and
discovered a "meth bong" inside the air filter compartment of Purdum's vehicle.
(Id.)

Officer Reeder then arrested Purdum for possession of a controlled

substance (I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1)). (R., p.6.)
The state charged Purdum with possession of a controlled substance (I.C.

3

37-2732(c)(I)) by information (R., p.22), and alleged that Purdum violated

terms 5, 6, 12, and 9 of the Probation Order (R., pp.63-65). Purdum moved to
suppress "because there was lack of probable cause or a valid reason for initially
stopping or searching the defendant." (R., pp.27-28 (emphasis added)). The
state and Purdum stipulated to the facts as set forth in the police report (R., pp.37), the terms of the Community Corrections Agreement (Exhibit d), and that
Purdum's probation officer did not request that the officer stop and search
Purdum (12/15/2005 Tr., p.1, L.15 - p.4, L.11). In his brief, Purdum argued that
"the officers who stopped Mr. Purdum had no 'individualized reasonable
suspicion' Mr. Purdum was involved in criminal conduct." (R., p.40.)
After a hearing on January 27, 2006 (R., pp.51-52), the district court
determined that based on the express language of the Probation Order, Purdum
"consented to warrantless searches as a term of his probation, and . . .
consented to allow any probation or law enforcement officer to request a blood,
breath, or urine test, [so] the deputy did not need reasonable suspicion to make

the stop." (R., p.60.)2 Purdum entered a conditional guilty plea preserving the
right to challenge the denial of his motion to suppress.

(R., pp.65-66, 68.)

Purdum timely appeals.

% transcript of this hearing is not part of the record on appeal and the minutes
(R, pp.51-52) do not indicate that the court took any further evidence.

ISSUE
Purdum states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Purdum's Motion to
Suppress by concluding that Mr. Purdum had waived ail of his
Fourth Amendment rights as a condition of probation?
(Appellant's brief, p.4.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Purdum failed to show the district court erred in denying his motion to
suppress?

ARGUMENT
The District Court Correctly Denied Purdum's Motion To Suppress
A.

Introduction
Purdum claims on appeal, as he did below (R., pp.27,40), that the officers

did not have the authority to stop him and make a request for a drug test without
a reasonable suspicion and he only waived his Fourth Amendment Rights to
stops and searches performed by his probation officer. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-

10.) However, the Probation Order plainly states that Purdum "shall submit to
random blood, breath andlor urine analysis upon the request of the Court, his
probation officer or anv law enforcement official." (R., p.95 (emphasis added).) If
Purdum agreed to submit to a search of his blood, breath, and urine upon
request of a law enforcement officer as he concedes, it follows that Officer
Reeder had the authority to stop Purdum and make the request without any
separate and distinct reasonable suspicion that Purdum was violating the terms
of his probation.
Moreover, because the officers had probable cause to arrest Purdum for
obstruction of an officer and the officers in fact arrested Purdum for this crime,
the searches of Purdum were justified as a search incident to arrest. The district
court's order denying Purdum's motion to suppress should be affirmed.

B.

Standard of Review
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. An

appellate court accepts the trial court's findings of fact which are supported by
substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of constitutional principles

to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 ldaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284,
1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a hearing, the power to assess the credibility of
witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences
is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 ldaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d

C.

According To Paraqraph 8 Of The Probation Order The Officer Could Stop
Purdum And Request A Random Blood, Breath. Or Urine Analysis Druq
Test
In both the trial court (R., p.27) and on appeal (Appellant's brief, pp.6-10)

Purdum directly challenges Officer Reeder's authority to stop him initially and
request a drug test (Appellant's brief, pp.7-8), and argues that because Officer
Reeder did not have the authority to stop him under the terms of the Community
Corrections Agreement. The state submits that because paragraph 8 of the
Probation Order required Purdum to "submit" to a drug test by "any law
enforcement officer" (R., p.95), it follows that Officer Reeder could stop Purdum
and request a drug test without any separate reasonable suspicion that Purdum
was violating the terms of his probation.
"ldaho appellate courts have long recognized that parolees and
probationers have a diminished expectation of privacy and will enforce Fourth
Amendment waivers as a condition of parole or probation." State v. Cruz, 2007
Opinion No. 41, p.4 (June 12, 2007) (citing State v. Gawron, 112 ldaho 841, 843,
736 P.2d 1295, 1297 (1987); State v. Peters, 130 ldaho 960, 963, 950 P.2d
1299, 1302 (Ct. App. 1997)); State v. Devore, 134 ldaho 344, 347, 134 P.2d 153,
'156 (Ct. App. 2000); State v. Spencer, 139 ldaho 736, 738-740, 85 P.3d 1135 ,

1137-1139 (Ct. App. 2004). Also, a court may impose terms of probation that
restrict constitutional rights as long as the term bears a reasonable relation to the
defendant's criminal activities and the court gives the defendant notice of the
terms. State v. Russell, 122 ldaho 515, 518-519, 835 P.2d 1326, 1329-1330
(1991) (opinion vacated in part on other grounds by State v. Russell, 122 ldaho
488, 835 P.2d 1299 (1992)). "'A defendant may decline probation, should he
consider its terms too onerous, and demand instead to be sentenced by the
court."' State v. Tesheep, 122 ldaho 759, 760, 838 P.2d 888, 889 (Ct. App.
1992) (citing State v. Sandoval, 92 ldaho 853, 861, 952 P.2d 350, 358 (1969));
State v. Franklin, 87 ldaho 291, 298, 392 P.2d 552, 555 (1964); State v.
Breeden, 129 ldaho 813,816,932 P.2d 936,939 (Ct. App. 1997).
Purdum was a probationer subject to the terms of a court order that he
accepted. Paragraph 8 of the Probation Order required him to "submit" to a drug
test when requested by a law enforcement officer. (R., p.95.) In fact, Purdum
concedes that he was "subject to a search of his blood, breath, or urine" by law
enforcement officers pursuant paragraph 8 of the Probation Order. (Appellant's
brief, p.10.) It follows that if Purdurn is to submit to a request for a drug test, then
a law enforcement officer can approach Purdum and stop him to make the
request. The record shows that Officer Reeder stated that he intended to stop
Purdurn "because of [Purdum] being on felony probation and his probation
stating that any officer may stop him and ask for a UA." (R., p.4.)

Purdum

stipulated that the officer approached him to request a drug test.

(R., p.4;

12/15/2005 Tr., p.1, L.15 - p.4, L.1I).

There is no indication the officer

approached Purdum for any other purpose.
Purdum argues that Officer Reeder was required to possess a separate
reasonable suspicion that Purdum was violating his probation in order to stop
Purdum and ask for a urinalysis test. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-8.) This argument
is unreasonable because probationers like Purdum would be able to forever
evade court ordered random drug testing by simply running off.

As stated

recently in State v. Cruz, such a situation allows probationers "to play this shell
game with

[I

officers [which] would defeat the state's substantial interest in

closely monitoring" probationers. State v. Cruz, Docket No. 31880, 2007 Opinion
No. 41, p.7 (June 12,2007).
Importantly, Purdum never challenged paragraph 8 as unreasonable or
unrelated to the goals of probation, and has never claimed that he did not
voluntarily accept probation and its terms, or that he did not have notice of the
term. (R., pp.44-45.) Based on paragraph 8 of the Probation Order and the
stipulated facts, the district court correctly concluded that the officer could stop
Purdum and request a drug test. (R., pp.59-60.)
Because Paragraph 8 requires Purdum to "submit" to a request for a drug
test by a law enforcement officer, Purdum's argument is ultimately irrelevant.
The district court's order denying his motion to suppress should be affirmed.
D.

The Search Of Purdum's Person Was Justified As A Search Incident To

Arrest

Although neither the Probation Order, nor the Community Corrections
Agreement gave Officer Reeder the same authority to search Purdum's person

or property as it gave Purdum's probation officers, Officer Reeder's searches of
Purdum are otherwise justified. Where the lower court reaches the correct result
by relying on an incorrect legal theory, the appellate court will affirm the result
under the correct legal theory. McKinnev v. State, 133 ldaho 695, 700, 992 P.2d
144, 149 (1999); State v. Avelar, 129 ldaho 700, 704, 931 P.2d 1218, 1222
(1997); see also State v. Rhoades, 134 ldaho 862, 864, 11 P.3d 481,483 (2000).
The alternative theory need not have been raised before the trial court. State v.

m,134 ldaho 870, 874, 11 P.3d 489,493 (Ct. App. 2000). The state submits
that Officer Reeder's search of Purdum and his vehicle are justified as a search
incident to arrest for obstruction of an officer.
A search incident to a valid arrest is among the well-delineated exceptions
to the warrant requirement and, thus, does not violate the Fourth Amendment
proscription against unreasonable searches. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752,
762-63 (1969); State v. Moore, 129 ldaho 776, 781, 932 P.2d 899, 904 (Ct. App.
1996). Pursuant to this exception, the police may search an arrestee incident to
a lawful custodial arrest. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973);

Moore, 129 ldaho at 781, 932 P.2d at 904.

It is of no consequence whether the

search is conducted before or after the arrest is made. Rawiinas v. Kentuckv,
448 U.S. 98, Ill (1980). However, the probable cause to arrest must be
apparent before the search is conducted. State v. Johnson, 137 ldaho 656, 662,
51 P.3d 1112, 1118 (Ct. App. 2002).
Probable cause is the possession of information that would lead a person
of ordinary care and prudence to believe or entertain an honest and strong

suspicion that a person they have placed under arrest is guilty of a crime.

See

State v. Julian, 129 ldaho 133, 136, 922 P.2d 1059, 1062 (1996). Probable
cause is not measured by the same level of proof required for conviction.

Id.

Rather, probable cause deals with the factual and practical considerations on
which reasonable and prudent persons act. Brineqar v. United States, 338 U.S.
160, 175 (1949); Julian, 129 ldaho at 136, 922 P.2d at 1062. When reviewing an
officer's actions, the court must judge the facts against an objective standard.

Juiian, 129 ldaho at 136, 922 P.2d at 1062. That is, would the facts available to
the officer, at the moment of the seizure or search, warrant a reasonable person
in holding the belief that the action taken was appropriate.

Id. A probable cause

analysis must allow room for mistakes on the part of the arresting officer but only
the mistakes of a reasonable person acting on facts which sensibly led to his or
her conclusions of probability. Kerley, 134 ldaho at 874, 11 P.3d at 493
Officer Reeder had probable cause to arrest Purdum for obstruction of an
officer once Purdum ran from him. ldaho Code section 18-705 provides:
Every person who wilfully resists . . . any public officer, in the
discharge, or attempt to discharge, of any duty of his office . . .
when no other punishment is prescribed, is punishable by a fine not
exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), and imprisonment in the
county jail not exceeding one (1) year.
Three elements must be proven to demonstrate the offense of resisting and
obstructing an officer: (1) the person who was resisted, delayed or obstructed
was a law enforcement officer, (2) the defendant knew that the person was an
officer, and (3) the defendant also knew at the time of the resistance that the
officer was attempting to perform some official act or duty. I.C. § 18- 705; State

v. Adams, 138 ldaho 624, 67 P.3d 103 (2003). The word "duty" encompasses
both lawful and authorized acts of an officer. State v. Wiedenheft, 136 ldaho 14,
16, 27 P.3d 873, 875 (2001).
Officer Reeder's status as a law enforcement officer has never been
challenged, and the record ( R pp.4-6) and Purdum's own arguments
(Appellant's brief, pp.5-10) support this conclusion. Also, Purdum knew that
Officer Reeder was an officer because Officer Reeder approached Purdum in a
patrol car with lights. (R., p.4.) Finally, Purdum knew at the time he ran off that
he was on probation and subject to terms and conditions that required him to
communicate with law enforcement officers, and that the Probation Order
required law enforcement officers to perform some duties of supervision (i.e.,
requesting drug tests). Moreover, Officer Reeder indicated he wanted to talk with
Purdum when he turned on his patrol lights. (R., p.4.) The record, then, shows
that from the time Purdum first ran from his truck (R., p.4.), Officer Reeder had
probable cause to arrest him for obstruction, and Officer Reeder indicated he
would arrest Purdum for this crime when Officer Reeder first made contact with
Purdum in the shed (R., pp.4-5). Officer Reeder then arrested Purdum prior to
the search of his person and vehicle for the offense of obstruction of an officer.
(R., p.5.)
"The permissible scope and purposes of a search incident to arrest is not
limited to the removal of weapons but includes the discovery and seizures of
evidence of crime and articles of value which, if left in the arrestee's possession,
might be used to facilitate his escape."

Moore,

129 ldaho at 781, 932 P.2d at

904.

Once Officer Reeder had arrested Purdum, he could search Purudm's

person for evidence of crimes and any articles of value that Purdum may use to
further facilitate his escape

E.

The State's Interests Outweiahed Purdum's Sianificantly Reduced Privacy
Riqhts Such That Officer Reeder Could Search Purdum's Vehicle Based
On A Reasonable Suspicion That It Contained Methamphetamine
When officers searched Purdum incident to arrest they found evidence

that

gave

rise to

a

reasonable

suspicion that

Purdum was

using

methamphetamine. Because probationers do not have the same expectation of
privacy, this reasonable suspicion justified the search of the car. "The United
State's Supreme Court recently analyzed the constitutionality of warrantless
searches of parolees and probationers under the general Fourth Amendment
approach of examining the totality of the circumstances."

State v. Cruz, 2007

Opinion No. 41, Docket No. 31880, p.4 (June 12, 2007) (citing United States v.
Kniahts, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001)). The Supreme Court concluded:
[tjhe touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, and
the reasonableness of a search "is determined by assessing, on the
one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual's
privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the
promotion of legitimate governmental interests . . . Inherent in the
very nature of probation is that probationers "do not enjoy 'the
absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled.' "
Kniahts, 534 U.S. at 118-119 (citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300,
119 S.Ct. 1297 (1999), Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874, 107 S.Ct. 3164
(1987)).
On balance, the search of Purdum's vehicle was justified because Purdum
had a significantly reduced expectation of privacy that was outweighed by the

government's interest in furthering the goals of probation-rehabilitation and the
protection of society such that Officer Reeder needed only a reasonable
suspicion to search Purdum's vehicle. As evidenced by the Fourth Amendment
waivers Purdum agreed to in paragraph 6 of the Community Corrections
Agreement and paragraph 14 of the Probation Order, even though these applied
to probation officers, Purdum received significantly diminished privacy rights
while on probation. Moreover, the mere fact that Purdum was subject to these
conditions shows that they were necessary to "further [state's] the two primary
goals of probation-rehabilitation and protecting society from further criminal
violations." Kni~hts,534 U.S. at 119, 122 S.Ct. at 592. On the side of the state's
interest, like most probationers Purdum was "more likely than the ordinary citizen
to violate the law" Griffin, 483 U.S. at 880, and had "even more of an incentive to
conceal [his] criminal activities and quickly dispose of incriminating evidence . . .
because probationers are aware that they may be subject to supervision and
face revocation of probation and possible incarceration," Knights, 534 U.S. at
120, 122 S.Ct. at 592. In fact, at the time of the search of Purdum's vehicle,
Purdum was under arrest for violating the law and fled the scene in an attempt to
conceal his criminal activities. The state's interest, then, outweighs Purdum's
privacy rights such that under Kni~hts,Officer Reeder needed only possess a
reasonable suspicion to conduct a search of Purdum's vehicle.
"[Tjhe degree of individualized suspicion required of a search is a
determination of when there is a sufficiently high probability that criminal conduct
is occurring to make the intrusion on the individual's privacy interest reasonable."

Kniahts, 534 U.S at 121, 122 S.Ct. at 592. Officer Reeder had a reasonable
suspicion that Purdum, who was subject to search conditions, was engaged in
criminal activity such that the intrusion into his vehicle was reasonable. Officer
Reeder knew that Purdum was on probation for methamphetamine possession
(R., p.4), and had just arrested Purdum for violating the law (R., p.5).
Officer Reeder discovered multiple items related to methamphetamine use
on Purdum's person during the search incident to arrest: two bic lighters and one
butane lighter (R., p.5). Based on these items and Purdum's prior conviction,
Officer Reeder continued his search into the vehicle Purdum was seen fleeing
just prior to his arrest. (id.) There, Officer Reeder discovered more evidence of
methamphetamine use: a butane torch and a can of butane in the glove box, as
well as a bottle of Visine and a bottle of Golden Seal urinary supplements and a
number 8 pool ball in the center console. (R., p.5.) Moreover, in the "back of the
vehicle," Officer Reeder discovered a propane torch. (Id.) Based on his training
and experience, Officer Reeder identified the items as associated with
methamphetamine use and proceeded to search Purdum's engine compartment
because "that's where drugs and paraphernalia are hidden." (R., p.5.) Based
upon the totality of the circumstances and his training and experience, Officer
Reeder's search of the engine of Purdum's vehicle produced the homemade
bong and methamphetamine. (Id.)
Purdum's challenge to the search of his person or vehicle fails because
Officer Reeder conducted a lawful search of Purdum's vehicle. Purdum makes
no attempt on appeal to meet his burden and show otherwise. As a result, the

district court reached the right conclusion by denying Purdum's motion to
suppress and the order should be affirmed.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the denial of Purdum's
motion to suppress.
DATED this 30th day of August, 2007.
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